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ABSTRACT
Despite their familiarity with the digital, so-called ‘digital natives’
are not tech-savvy, particularly with respect to privacy and security.
In this study we characterize this problem by looking at a cohort
of South African students. We employ a web-based survey of 100
students, supplemented by in-depth interviews with 10 additional
students. In both cases we inquired about, and observed knowledge
of permissions, encryption and application installation practices.
Our findings show that most students (80%) do not look for or
understand permissions or encryption, and use location-based ser-
vices unsafely. Based on these results we argue that digital natives
lack the technical skills and understanding to properly engage with
mobile privacy and security. We further argue that this genera-
tion has been so over-exposed to mobile requests that violate their
privacy and security that they have become desensitized and their
definition of privacy and security has changed. Lastly, we discuss
the implications of our findings for higher education institutions,
policy, and mobile application design.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Usability in security and privacy;
• Human-centered computing → Empirical studies in ubiq-
uitous and mobile computing;
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1 INTRODUCTION
South African Higher Education is in a process of reform and re-
structuring to redress the past and to move South Africa closer
to a knowledge economy [10]. Part of this process is the drive to
include ICT (Information and Communication Technology) in the
Higher Education sector driven by government policies such as:
The National Development Plan, the National Development plan
for Higher Education and The National Research Development
Strategy. All of these documents speak to the need for Higher Edu-
cation to adopt ICT in order to deliver graduates who are equipped
with 21st Century skills to join the Knowledge economy [10]. In
response to this movement Higher Education institutions (HEIs)
have seen a particularly large growth in mobile phone usage on
their networks. According to Porter et al [37] more and more HEIs
are implementing blended learning using popular Learning Man-
agement Systems such as Blackboard. To ensure accessibility to
these systems, institutions often offer free WiFi to their students.
These students access networks and institutional content on their
mobile phones through a mobile application often provided by the
developers of the LMS.
Most students currently enrolled in these institutions were born
in the digital age and are often referred to as digital natives. Barak [6]
describes these students as immersed in technology, more tech-
savvy than the generations before them and well versed in the
online world. However, Kurkovsky and Sytya’s 2010 study Digital
Natives and Mobile Phones [29] found that digital natives are not
technologically advanced, lack knowledge on privacy and secu-
rity and often down play the risks of using mobile phones. We
argue that the digital proficiency of these students may still be over-
estimated, particularly in their awareness and perception of mobile
security and privacy. Later works by Gkioulos et al [19] indicate
that Kurkovsky’s findings are still valid today. Both sets of authors
argue that while digital natives might interact with technology
differently than previous generations, there is little evidence that
they have a better understanding of privacy and security. This lack
of “tech-savvyness" combined with the drive for ICT in HEIs in
South Africa, which in turn leads to the en masse uptake of mo-
bile technology, pose very real implications for both the design of
mobile security and HEIs
In order to further investigate, we surveyed 77 and conducted
in-depth interviews with 10 students at a premier private under-
graduate university in South Africa.
We tested the interactions of digital natives with Android-based
application permissions, location-based services and encryption
technologies to understand how students interacted with mobile
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privacy and security features. In this paper we present the results as
well as the implications for the design of Android’s mobile security
and HEIs.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
In the South African context, eighty nine percent (89%) of South
African institutions make use of a BYOT (Bring Your Own Technol-
ogy) policy to harness the prospects of blended and m-learning [13,
34, 38]. Of these devices, Android is the most popular mobile oper-
ating system with over 70% [47] of the market share. Unfortunately,
the open source nature of this operating system also makes it the
most likely to be attacked by malware [15, 31, 41]. Mobile devices
are infected by malware either by attackers finding and exploiting
vulnerabilities or by users being tricked into installing malicious
applications [28]. This malware is then able to exploit users’ private
information. Android offers a permissions-based model aimed at as-
sisting users and protecting their privacy [2]. However, this model
comes with shortcomings of its own. The model is too coarse [47],
places too much responsibility on the user, uses no sand-boxing
and an open market [43]. Applications also often make use of more
permissions than explicitly disclosed to the user [7]. Android relies
on developers to include encryption in their applications. Sadly
users do not normally enable encryption services [35], even if they
are available. It is a well-known fact that users are often the weakest
link in any security system [30]. In line with this, previous works
have indicated that users do not understandmobile permissions [27]
and therefore tend to ignore them [24]. Furthermore, users tend
to be neglectful when it comes to security features [24, 35]. This
behavior can be attributed to the fact that users are unaware of
the possible dangers that lurk on their mobile devices, nor are they
aware of the value of their personal data. Little attention has been
paid to the effect this may have on institutional policy. The Council
for Higher Education (CHE) makes mention of the lack of a coor-
dinated policy to govern ICT in HEIs. This is echoed by Jaffer et
al [25] who state that no coordinated policy exists at government
or institutional level. Czerniewicz et al [12]explains that Higher Ed-
ucation ICT policy in South Africa is an emerging field of enquiry
that has not enjoyed much attention. Ruxwana and Msibi [40]
found that most South African HEIs are only partially ready for the
adoption of a BYOT approach, with student education in terms of
privacy and security being one of their main areas of concern. In
line with Ruwana and Msisibi, Chin et al [11] argues for a fit for
purpose and effective training program that would assist students
with the safe and secure use of mobile devices on campuses.
3 METHODS
Because this study aimed to look at complex user behavior, a mixed
method approach was used. The use of qualitative observations and
interviews allowed us to gain deeper insights into the quantitative
data gathered from our survey. We also used the qualitative data to
validate the quantitative data . This process was chosen in order to
gain an holistic view of students interactions with mobile privacy
and security.
Simple random sampling was implemented by obtaining a list
of the 1450 students enrolled at the HEI, but not including the
students studying information technology, since android security
and privacy is taught as a part of their curriculum. The list was
scrambled to ensure that the names were not in alphabetical order
or listed by qualification. Next, the list was numbered sequentially.
An online random number generator was used to randomly gener-
ate 150 numbers. 150 students matching the randomly generated
numbers were selected for the study. We targeted 120 responses for
the survey, thus the 150 selected students were invited to complete
the survey. 130 Students responded. 27 Incomplete responses were
removed. The first question of the survey also queried whether the
respondents were android users. 26 responses of non-Android users
were removed. This left 77 completed responses from confirmed
Android users. . It is possible that the removal of non Android users
could introduce selection bias into the study. However, the wide
range of responses and anonymity of the survey mitigates these
effects.
3.1 Survey
The survey was designed to include questions aimed at testing
the validity of the student’s responses. For example, we presented
the students with three questions regarding granting permissions
to the custom developed applications. We first showed them the
permissions in a list form and not in the familiar Google Play
store setting. We then asked the students to tick each of the listed
permissions they would allow for the application. In the very next
question, we showed them the permissions as listed on the Google
Play Store in a screen shot, these permissions are identical to the
permissions in the first question. We asked the students if they
would install the application and to give reasons for either installing
or not installing the application.
To gather qualitative data a new was used. Ten additional num-
bers were randomly selected from the original list (excluding any-
one originally selected for the survey) and asked to install two
custom developed applications under observation. Following the
observation, the students underwent a brief interview.
3.2 Observations and In-depth Interviews
In order to gather observation data two custom applications were
developed: a chat application and a rating application. The chat
application (See Figure 1) requested permissions one would expect
from a chat application, however the functionality of the application
did not match the permissions requested. The application is a text-
only chat application which includes no functionality for uploading
images, sharing contacts, voice notes and so forth. The application
was published to the Google Play Store and listed as a text only
chat application named Chatter. This application also contained an
image of an open lock on the chat screen. This image indicated that
the application is not making use of encryption and was selected
from the Android Materials development icons.
Canteenrater (See Figure 2) allowed the students to give a star-
rating for the university canteen. The application was also over-
provisioned and blatantly requested permissions that one would not
expect from a rating application. This application simply allowed
users to give a rating value and a comment.
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Figure 1: Screenshot of the Chatter app used during inter-
views and for the survey.
Figure 2: Screenshot of the Canteenrater app used during
interviews and for the survey. .
3.3 Deception
Since we aimed to study the normal behavior of students, deception
was introduced into the study. If we had informed the students that
the study explored their perceptions and behaviors with mobile pri-
vacy and security, undue attention could have been drawn to these
areas. To counter the phenomenon the participants were briefed
that they were taking part in a usability study for two applications
developed for the institution. The deception was revealed during
the one on one interview or in a written disclosure at the end of the
survey. A campus counselor was made available to all participants
after the experiment. Any students who experienced emotional dis-
tress were directed to the counselor and had the option to exclude
their data from the study. None of the participants needed the ser-
vices of the counselor. The interview and observation participants
were remunerated with a fifty rand canteen voucher redeemable
at the institution’s on campus canteen. We discuss our findings in
the section that follows:
4 FINDINGS
4.1 Understanding of Permissions and Security
4.1.1 Students do not pay attention to application installation per-
missions. Only four out of 77 (5%) of the students paid attention to
mobile permissions whilst they installed applications. 14 out of 77
(18%) of the surveyed students indicated that they would abort an
installation due to discomfort with the permissions requested. Two
out of 10 of the observed students denied the over-provisioned per-
missions for both applications and two out of 10 of the interviewed
students listed the permissions of the applications as unusual.When
we asked the interview candidates why they did not pay attention
to the permissions they offered the following comments:
“I never read those permissions, I just click yes, yes,
yes."
“ Those things are irritating - I just want to get to try
the app."
When we asked why they were not worried about installing appli-
cations without considering the permissions, many of the students
comments such as:
“No one is out to get me."
4.1.2 Students do not pay attention to run time permissions. We
found a large disparity between what students believe they do and
what they actually did. When seeing a list of permissions outside of
the Play Store environment an overwhelming number of students
indicated that they would not allow the mobile permissions used for
our two mobile applications : 49 out of 77 (64% )for chat application
and 55 out of 77 (71%) for rating application. This changed when we
showed them screen-shots of the very same application permissions,
taken from the Play Store. Then, 56 out of 77 (72%)of the students
indicated that they would install the chat application and 40 out
of 77 (52%) of the students indicated that they would install the
rating application. Of those students who still chose not to install
the applications, permissions was only a factor in 16 out of 77
(20%) for the chat application and 19 out of 77 (25%)for the rating
application. Some of the reasons students provided for not installing
the applications are as:
“ I do not buy food from the canteen."
“ I don’t think that the application would be useful to
me."
4.1.3 Students have become desensitized to permissions that are
often requested. An interesting finding that emerged is that 9 out of
10 of the students referred to the dangerous permissions requested
by the applications as standard, default or expected permissions.
Some of their responses are:
“Yes, they are the standard permissions that all appli-
cations ask for.”
“Yes, those are fine – they are the standard permis-
sions”.
When questioned further it emerged that students trust these
permissions because they are requested by most applications. Over
time, students have become desensitized to these permissions and
now believe that these permission requests are safe. The list of
permissions that students described as standard permissions is
detailed below:
• Access to Camera
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• Access to Microphone: Allows applications to turn the voice
recorder on and off.
• Access to Storage: Allows application to read the files stored
on the mobile device.
• Access to Wifi: Can turn wireless network on or off and
make connections.
• Access to Location: Discloses the physical location of the
user using GPS coordinates.
• Access to Phone Calls: Can make and accept phone calls on
the mobile device.
The Android App Permissions Best Practices Guide instructs devel-
opers not to use more permissions than needed and to step back
the functionality of their application for those users who elect to
deny permissions. [3]. Unfortunately the open nature of the android
markets and the lack of an in depth evaluation process makes it
possible for developers to ignore these best practices [46].
4.1.4 Students are not aware that applications make use of more
permissions than the explicitly requested permissions. None of the
students were aware that applications make use of more permis-
sions than those explicitly requested. Furthermore none of the
students knew how to display the list of full permissions on their
device nor where to look for the permissions used by each appli-
cation. All the students were unnerved when they were shown
the full list of permissions used by each application. The students
responded with statements such as:
“No!"
“I seriously did not know that, this is so scary.”
Gerber and Volkamer [18] found similar behavior in their study.
They attributed these findings to the fact that other permissions
(as the Play Store refers to protection level normal permissions)
are hard to find and not disclosed to users. [4]. Fang et al [17]
further explains that these unknown permissions could stealthily
leak users private data.
4.2 Technical Ability with regards to
permissions and privacy
4.2.1 Students do not match the permissions requested to the func-
tionality of the application. None of the interviewed studentsmatched
the functionality of the applications to the permissions requested
by the application. When this was further queried, most of the
students indicated that the idea of matching permissions requests
to the functionality of the application was not something they had
ever thought about.
One out of 77 (1%) of the students noticed that the permissions
requested by the chat application did not match its functionality .
This is interesting, since we clearly stated that the chat application
was text-only. Some of their comments were:
“I would not install the app [sic] as a text only app
does not need permission to camera.”
13 Out of 77 (16%) noticed that the rating application was over
provisioned. This likely due to the over provisioning of the appli-
cation being extremely evident. The following comments provide
more information on the above.
“ The app doesn’t necessarily need any of those per-
missions to work "
“ I would ask myself why the app will need any of
those permissions - and for what reason."
“An application of this nature should not need access
to contacts as well as camera and microphone as it
only needs to rate the canteen. "
Liu et al [32] attributes similar findings to user’s expectations
and mental models. The students expected a chat application that
requested access to certain permissions however, they did not ex-
pect the same permissions from a rating application. These students
have created a mental model [26] of what permissions a chat appli-
cation or rating app would require, the over provisioning matched
their expectations and mental model. This clearly indicates that
students will pay little attention to the actual functionality of an
application versus the permissions that the application requests if
their mental models and expectations are matched.
4.2.2 Students do not notice if updates change mobile permissions.
15 Out of 77 (33%) of the surveyed students indicated that they
considered changes in mobile permissions when they updated mo-
bile applications. One out of 10 of the observed students indicated
that they checked if the permissions changed after an application
updated. Unfortunately, none of the observed students could suc-
cessfully show us where to check the mobile permissions used by
each application. This finding can be attributed to the fact that An-
droid based updates are now largely automatic. Android handsets
now ship with the Automatic updates over Wi-Fi feature enabled by
default. This setting allows applications to not only install patches
or update features, but to also automatically update the dangerous
permissions used by the application. A recent XDA article [14]
explains the security loophole created by this default setting by
stating that a Reddit user was able to automatically update the
permissions of his android app. These updated permissions allowed
him to format the storage of any device the application is installed
on.
4.3 Student Understanding of Location Based
Services
4.3.1 Students believe they consider location services, however the
data indicates that they do not. When students were shown the Ac-
cess to Location permission requested by each mobile application
in a survey question, 59 out of 77 (77%) students indicated that
they would not allow this permission for the text only chat app. A
further 56 out of 77 (72%) indicated that they would not allow the
permission for the rating application. However, in spite of these
responses 56 out of 77 (72%) students elected to install the chat
application listing the very same permissions they denied. Only 12
out of 77 (16%) students indicated that they consider location ser-
vices when installing applications. Li et al [30] had similar findings
in their study looking into the attack vectors created by LBS. They
found that surprisingly few users paid attention to the applications
on their handsets that made use of LBS. Many of the interviewed
students indicated that they were not aware which applications on
their mobile phones used LBS and most of them did not consider
the applications that are pre-installed.
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4.3.2 Students are unsure how location tracking services works. At
least two out of 10 (20%)interviewed students indicated that they
were not concerned with location services since they never turn
it on for too long or only use it to check in quickly. None of these
students paid attention to the fact their current location would be
known regardless of how long they enabled the service for. Some
of the comments offered were as follows:
“I only turn my location on quickly to check in, then
I turn it back off."
“I don’t leave it on all the time, only when I am out
and about."
Further to this, 31 out of 77 (40%) surveyed students indicated
that they were not worried about location services because: “No one
is out to get them”. Li et al [30] supports this finding by stating that
users have little understanding around the danger posed by location
based services.. No exploits are needed to track user locations and
display individual identities, the data released by the LBS service
was enough to gather the information.
4.4 Understanding of encryption as a security
measure
4.4.1 Students do not know what encryption is nor do they recognize
encryption symbols. 2 Out of 10 of interviewed students indicated
that they knew what encryption was and provided a very vague
explanation of encryption. The survey respondents provided incon-
sistent answers when asked if they would abort an install based
on the lack or presence of encryption in a single survey question.
The inconsistency was introduced in two survey questions in order
to ensure that our findings were correct (the research questions
listed both the presence and lack of encryption as a reason to not
install an application). Mylonas [35] had similar findings, only
Table 1: Students displaying inconsistent encryption related
answers
What would prevent you from installing
an app from HEI Name?
Y N
Presence of Encryption 4% 96%
Lack of Encryption 12% 85%
twenty two percent (22%) of his subjects understood or enabled
the encryption features on their mobile devices. None of the ob-
served and interviewed students noticed the open lock on the chat
application’s chat screen None of the students linked the lock to
encryption. This is not a problem unique to South Africa or even
to third world countries. The European Data Protection Supervisor
(EDPS) [45] states that all mobile applications should use and ade-
quately display the fact that they use encryption. The EDPS goes
on to state that users recognize that "https" in a web browser URL
indicates encryption??,however few mobile applications make use
of consistent symbols to indicate whether encryption is present.
The EDPS 2015 guidelines state that more should be done to explic-
itly show that applications make use of encryption [45]. The EDPS
further urges developers to make use of encryption, especially for
international connections. Developers could also include a short
explanation of why encryption is important.
Figure 3: Example of WhatsApp using both an encryption
icon and a short message to indicated the presence of en-
cryption.
4.5 Overall student competency in terms of
mobile permissions, encryption and
location based services
Only two of the surveyed students and one of the interviewed
students were consistent and competent in their answers when it
came to considering privacy and security. Rashidi et al [39] found
that three percent (3%) of their survey respondents consistently
answered the security and privacy questions and could thus be
seen as competent. This is an alarmingly small amount of Rashidi
et al’s and our population which speaks directly to the usability
of the Android security and privacy ecosystem. These authors go
as far as to recommend a secondary security measure to decide if
applications should be placed in a probation setting before they can
be deemed as safe.
5 DISCUSSION
In line with Kurkovsky’s findings, it is clear that the security and
privacy behavior of digital natives have not changed much. How-
ever, the mobile privacy and security landscape has changed and is
nowmuchmore complex. The amount of mobile applications and in
turn, malicious applications has grown from thirty-eight thousand
available applications in 2009 to over three million applications in
July of 2018 1. Popular applications such as Facebook, Twitter and
LinkedIn have drastically altered their privacy statements [50] and
machine learning algorithms now actively use the data we supply
as we navigate the digital world [44]. If we consider these changes,
it becomes evident that a good understanding of how digital natives
approach mobile privacy and security is needed to inform security
and privacy design decisions. We characterize these approaches
below:
5.1 Digital natives lack the necessary technical
skills to engage with mobile privacy and
security.
Kurkovsky and Syta [29] found that digital natives lacked the tech-
nical skills to understand and safely use different authentication
methods. We can expand on this finding by stating that digital
natives lack the technical skills to properly engage with mobile
privacy and security as a whole. Our findings indicated that digital
1https://www.statista.com/statistics/266210/number-of-available-applications-in-
the-google-play-store/
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natives lacked the skills to recognize encryption symbols with none
of the interviewed students recognizing the lock icon as an indi-
cator for encryption. None of the students were able to navigate
to and show the full list of permissions used by the applications
installed on their phones. Students were further unable to explain
to us how to toggle dangerous permissions on and off and could not
explain how encryption works. It is this lack of skills that keeps
this generation from being able to act securely and make informed
decisions when they use mobile phones. It is true that they are
well adapted to social media and can be seen as very able in the
context of these platforms, however, this generation still has a lot
to learn when it comes to the general privacy and security settings
made available to them. This lack of skill leaves them vulnerable
to threats such as: identity theft, ransomware, spyware, data leaks,
viruses and a wide range of attacks. It is clear that mobile applica-
tions’ privacy and security features need to be designed for better
understanding. We need to create approaches that will actually be
understood by and match the technical ability of digital natives,
since our current approaches have clearly failed.
Lastly, it is imperative that Higher Education policy makers
and institutions take cognisance of the fact that this generation of
students require training specific to mobile privacy and security
features.
5.2 Digital natives do not understand mobile
and privacy features and therefore ignore
them.
Our findings indicated that digital natives do not understand how
mobile security and privacy works: They did not understand the rea-
son for permissions and in turn did not pay the necessary attention
to the permissions during the installation or use of an application.
They failed to match the permissions of an application to its func-
tionality and happily installed over provisioned applications. Lastly,
they did not understand how Location Based services worked nor
that their phone ships with applications that might have LBS en-
abled. Mylonas et al [35] had similar findings and agrees that users
opt to ignore security features that they do not understand or find
overwhelming. They further found that many of the participants
in their study did not enable the encryption features available to
them. Hanus et al [20] explains that users’ privacy and security
awareness plays a key role in their ability to protect themselves or
to safely use technology. Chanderman and Van Niekerk [9] echo
these findings by explaining that better security behavior is only
possible with better security awareness.
Unfortunately our findings showed that the current methods of
requesting permissions are not understood and therefore ineffec-
tive.
In order to possibly mitigate the above, the following should
be considered: Permissions should not be requested in permission
groups. It is true that Android no longer allows all the permissions
in a permission group upon a single permission request [5], however
permissions are still requested in permissions groups that show
only one rationale for all the permissions existing within that group.
For example, an application that requires access to answer phone
calls will show the same rationale as an application that requires
access to write to your voice mail. Students have no understanding
of permission groups and do not even know that they exist. They
therefore do not understand that the request they see does not
explain exactly what the application will be able to access and can
in fact be misleading. It might be better to list a rationale for each
of the permissions in a group when an application requests only
that permission.
Table 2: Android Phone Permission Group
Android Mobile Permission Group : Phone
Phone Read_phone_state
Read_phone_numbers
Call_phone
Answer_phone_calls
Add_voicemail
Use_sip
Figure 4: Phone Permission Group Rationale.
Digital natives do not understand the full extent of what they are al-
lowing applications access to on their mobile phones. Android and
Android developers should use better, more descriptive language
in their permission requests. Each request should explain why the
permission is necessary, what the permission will do and what will
happen if the user elects not to allow the permission. Android does
offer permission rationales to address this problem, however the
language in the rationales are still not user friendly enough, and fail
to communicate possible dangers of allowing unnecessary permis-
sions2. These rationales are over-simplified and bunch permissions
into groups which digital natives do not understand 3.
Lastly, HEIs should carefully consider the mobile applications
that they prescribe. Institutions should take time to investigate the
application in order to ensure that it employs good privacy and
security standards.
5.3 Digital natives have been over exposed to
application requests that violate their
privacy and have become desensitized.
Our findings and those of Harris et al [22] indicate that digital
natives have become desensitized to mobile permissions. Harris et
al focuses on the end user’s rationale that they have experienced no
adverse effect when installing mobile applications and accepting
2Android Central. https://www.androidcentral.com/run-permissions-why-change-
android-60-may-make-you-repeat-yourself Last Accessed 21 Sept 2018.
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permissions. My study found that almost the entire list of Android’s
dangerous permissions are requested so frequently and by so many
applications [21] that digital natives now believe that these are a set
of standard or default permissions. They see these permissions as a
step in the installation process, rather than a security and privacy
feature that requires their attention. This has led to permission
requests providing little or no security and privacy to digital natives
as they allow these permissions by default.
5.4 Digital natives trust the authors of software
and fail to act securely when security and
privacy features are requested out of
context.
The majority of the survey candidates and nine out of the ten in-
terviewed students believed that Google checks every application
that is uploaded to the play store. They trust that mobile devel-
opers take the time to develop and deliver safe and secure mobile
applications that will not leak their data. This is a fairly concerning
characteristic since the Cambridge Analytica [8] scandal clearly
indicated the consequences of believing that the information you
see and share is handled in a safe and secure manner. It is even
more concerning if one takes a look at the applications currently
available for download on the play store. Below is a snippet of
the various available applications with an almost identical icon to
that of Facebook’s messenger- all produced by different authors.
Students could inadvertently download the incorrect application
and in turn provide unknown parties with valuable and private
information. As mentioned before, students provided inconsistent
Figure 5: Similar Messenger Application Icons with Differ-
ent Authors on the Google Play Store.
Figure 6: Actual Facebook Messenger App.
responses when they were asked if they would install the custom
developed applications in two separate survey questions. The stu-
dents did not notice that the permissions were identical and in fact
for the same application. They were unable to navigate the change
in the context with regards to permission requests. This means
that HEIs can no longer assume that students will be able to safely
navigate mobile application markets and higher education policy
makers need to consider the fact that the drive for the uptake of
technology in Higher Education needs to go hand in hand with
policies to ensure that this is done safely.
5.5 Digital natives’ need for instant
gratification has consequences for privacy
and security.
Santos and Rosati [42] argue that the need for immediate gratifica-
tion is still one of the human race’s largest decision biases. Digital
natives grew up in a world where instant gratification is not only
a possibility, but a standard [48]. Our study indicated that their
attitude to security is no exception. Students admitted that they
would rather accept the permissions or any other requested security
feature to get the gratification of experiencing the application. By
doing this students could have inadvertently installed malicious
and possibly dangerous applications on their mobile phones. When
students were asked if they would have acted in the same manner
if the true nature of the applications were known upfront, almost
all of them indicated that they would have acted very differently.
They offered comments such as:
“I would not have installed the application, I see how
my actions were not smart."
“It does not seem worth it now, does it. "
Santos and Rosati further state that humans have learned to wait
for a better reward or lesser consequences in certain settings which
Fang and Wang [16] explain as hyperbolic discounting. They ex-
plain that humans are more likely to overlook or withstand instant
gratification if the rewards are more long term, however humans
are much more likely to opt for immediate gratification in the short
term. Unfortunately, the immediate access and quick turnaround
time of application downloads and installations leads to a much
higher likelihood of hyperbolic discounting taking place. If we con-
sider the fact that over eighty percent (80%) of the students we
observed installed the application with no regard for the permis-
sions, it is clear that hyperbolic discounting does take place.
Unfortunately the presence of hyperbolic discounting means
that any security feature aimed at providing protection to users
which is paired with instant gratification will be ineffective.
5.6 Digital natives’ definition of privacy is
different than those of previous
generations.
Both Kurkovsky and Palfrey [36] explain that digital natives’ defi-
nition of security is different than it was for previous generations.
They happily share their location, photographs, thoughts, music
play-lists, political beliefs, etc online. Palfrey goes as far as to say
that a radical paradigm shift took place and that this generation also
has a very different expectation of privacy. It could be possible that
this generation’s sense of security has eroded [23] and that they
are far easier to exploit than previous generations. Both Kurkosky
and Syta [29] and ourselves noted that Digital natives displayed
lack of fear or carelessness in their approaches to mobile privacy
and security. We now believe that this lack of fear / carelessness is in
fact a manifestation of these students eroded definition of privacy.
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HEIs and policy makers should consider this finding when they
prescribe applications to students. The onus lies on the institution to
ensure that they prescribe applications that are not over provisioned
and safe to use. Given the above discussions it is clear that there is
still a lot of research that needs to be done in this area of privacy and
security. We conclude our study and discuss some of the possible
future works next.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
Our findings were similar to those of Kurkovsky and Syta [29] who
also found that digital natives were not tech-savvy and in many
instances lacked the necessary skills needed to safely use mobile
applications. However, our study represents an in depth look at how
South African Higher Education students interacted with mobile
privacy and security features by focusing specifically on application
permissions, encryption and location based services. We offer a
characterization of their behavior in order to inform HEIs, Higher
Education Policy and mobile privacy and security designers.
We urge the abovementioned bodies to explore future works into
Higher Education Policies. If these policies are going to mandate
and drive the use of technology in HEIs, they should do so in an
ethical and safe manner.
HEIs need to conduct research into and then design a program
tailored to educating Digital natives about safe and secure mobile
application usage and general safe and secure online behaviour.
Lastly, both the Higher Education and development communities
need to introduce ethics to developers as soon as possible. HEIs
that offer computer science and information technology related
degrees need to include a section on ethics. Unfortunately, unethical
behavior in this realm has far reaching consequences which are not
always considered.
6.1 Limitations of the Study
This study only made use of students from a premier private higher
education institution. These students all attended majority private
schools and can be classed in LSM (Life Style Measurement) seven
and eight (Middle to Higher income brackets). No students from
the lower LSM’s or public institutions form part of the study.
We take cognisance of the work done by Ahmed [1], however,
South Africa has a large divide between the rich and poor in and
turn the ICT services these groups have access to. Molawa [33]
discusses the first and third world in Africa by describing the dif-
ferences with regard to first and third world living. Within South
Africa exist well developed, first world-like urban areas which are
usually populated by affluent South Africans and do not necessarily
match the populations discussed by Ahmed.
It is further possible that participants in the observation were
more trusting of the applications because they were led to believe
that the applications were being launched by the HEI they attend.
This possibly could have led students to act in a less secure manner
than they normally would.
This study made use of only millennials, which can be defined as
individuals born roughly between 1981 and 1996 [49] and heavily
influenced by the technology era. Because of this the findings of
this study could possibly not be extrapolated to the population as a
whole.
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